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Throughout history and still today women have had lower levels of political 
representation and participation in politics, even though in most settings women make up close 
to or more than half of the population. In recent years countries have enacted gender 
representation quotas (40 as of 2006; Quotaproject) to address this discrepancy and gender 
disparity in government by encouraging the equal representation of women in legislative and 
parliamentary offices. This is due to the influence of international reform movements led and 
supported by respected organizations and political conglomerates such as the United Nations and 
the European Union. The UN and other proponents of the gender representation movements had 
the goal of providing equality in the realm of government to women whose needs and unique 
perspectives were not sufficiently serviced under the current male-dominated political sphere.  
 
In the 1990’s a long list of countries around the world started enacting gender quotas in 
order to start taking the necessary steps towards achieving gender parity within politics, in 
specifically legislation. This push towards gender representation had as its inception the UN 
Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 from which governments were 
called on to commit to establishing gender balance in governmental bodies and committees, as 
well as to take measures to ensure women’s integration into elective and non- elective political 
positions. (UN WOMEN 1995) This resulted in gender representation quotas which in essence 
are quotas set by governing bodies or political parties to ensure that a certain number of 
legislative office seats (generally 30%) are held by women.  
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This paper builds on the work of Leslie Schwindt‐Bayer (2011) and Kotsadam and Nerman 
(2012) who aimed to measure the impacts of gender based quotas within legislature on political 
participation.  We will analyze the long-term effect of gender based quotas on a respondent’s 
political interest, confidence in government, confidence in congress and the attention they pay to 
political news on TV using the Latin Barometer yearly surveys conducted in Latin America and 
which are published and coordinated by the Corporacion LatinoBarometro. This time series 
analysis will encompass 17 years throughout 18 countries, 5 of which did not enact any form of 
gender-based quota. 
 
Considering that previous research has found that female leaders tend to put emphasis on 
different policies such as women’s health or infrastructure (Duflo 2004) this study hopes to 
assess the impact this has on the respondents’ confidence in government and congress. A 
hypothesis is that, as the share of women in legislature increases, women will see issues and 
policies they associate with being addressed and have a more favorable view of their governing 
bodies. 
 
We use the logistic and ordered logistic probability models, to estimate the likelihood that the 
enacted quota had a significant effect on the respondents’ interest in politics, confidence in 
government, confidence in congress and attention paid to political news on TV. The effects of 
gender-based quotas at the respondent level were statistically significant and positive for 
confidence in government and attention paid to political news. Like Schwindt‐Bayer (2011), we 
found no statistically significant effects of the quotas on political interest or confidence in 
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congress. However, when analyzing the gender-specific impact of the quota, we found a 
statistically significant and positive effect on interest in politics at higher levels of political 
interest.  
 
Gender representation quotas within Latin America were mainly enacted for Bicameral and 
Unicameral offices. These being legislative systems with two chambers such as the United 
States’ House and Senate which make up Congress and legislative systems with one legislative 
chamber. (QuotaProject) Below are the three types of quota systems: 
 
1) Reserved Seating: Women must fill a certain number of seats. 
2) Minimum Candidate requirement (on the ballot): A certain number of candidates 
must be women 
3) Voluntary requirement (within the political party) 
 
Throughout the 1990’s many Latin American countries enacted some sort of gender 
representation quota. This study focuses on this region due to its having similar religious, 
language and cultural histories. Brazil, where the national language is Portuguese, differs in 
language but shares aspects demographic profiles and histories of colonial conquest as in other 
Latin American countries. Thus, although varied in types of legislative governing, the countries 
share traits that make them ideal for analyzing the impact of gender quotas, being that certain 
countries did not enact them while others did. This paper hopes to utilize the set of countries that 
did not enact gender based quotas as the control group much like Duflo (2012), which studied a 
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randomized natural experiment conducted in 465 Indian villages in which some had instituted 
reserved seating for female legislators while others had not. 
Literature Review 
The topic of gender representation has been studied and analyzed in a variety of settings 
from local to country level and a large spectrum of countries across the world.  
 
In India, the work of Irma Clots-Figueras (2012) has found that there are positive 
externality effects from female leadership on women’s educational attainment. That is, female 
leadership had a positive statistically significant effect on educational attainment in women.  The 
politician’s gender was shown to have significant effects on educational attainment at the 
primary level in urban areas in what was described as the “role model” effect. Since job markets 
in urban areas have higher educational requirements than rural areas, having female leadership 
lead to positive effects on women completing primary level education. 
 
Beaman, Chattopadya and Duflo (2009) find that affirmative action policies such as 
reserved seating lead to an increase in perceptions of female leader effectiveness and a reduction 
in statistical discrimination against women.  The statistical discrimination resulting from voters 
viewing female candidates as too risky, thus risk averse voters will vote for the male candidates 
in addition to those who already express a dislike for female leaders. Duflo (2012) studied a 
similar natural experiment among young women aged 11-15, within villages in West Bengal. 
Having reserved seating led to a 25% & 32% reduction in the aspiration gap among boys and 
girls for both youth and their parents. Increased female leadership led to young girls being less 
interested in becoming housewives and more interested in independence (not having their parents 
 6 
choose marital options) and educational attainment. The experiment also found no negative 
effects for young boys.  Thus, at the village level, having visible female leaders led to significant 
decreases in aspiration gaps (being a housewife vs. seeking education) and significant increases 
in actual educational attainment. Although measuring these effects on educational attainment and 
aspirations at the country level is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be an informative 
expansion within the Latin American context. 
 
Gender quotas have been enacted as a result of a push for gender equality and hopes to 
achieve the high levels of political representation found in Scandinavian countries such as 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The quotas were enacted in hopes of catching up to the high 
representation rates of the Scandinavian countries which due to their secularization, women’s 
entry into the workforce in the 60’s and the strength of social-democratic parties had 
representation rates that far exceeded the 1997 world average of 10.38% (IPU.org; Dahlerup 
2003)  
 
Some of the main arguments for female representation quotas include (Dahlerup 2003): 
 Justice argument:  Women comprise half of the population and should have just as high 
representation 
 Experience argument: Women’s experiences differ from that of men due to biological 
and socially constructed reasons and therefore warrant representation 
 Interest group argument: Differing interests between women and men make men 
unsuitable to solely represent the interests of both. 
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Evidence for Dahlerup’s Interest group argument is found in the work of Esther Duflo 
(2004) who found that a politician’s gender does affect their political decisions. This finding 
exemplifies the implicit hypothesis behind Dahlerup’s (2003) argument, that women will have 
differencing interests and priorities in terms of governing and policy making which would not be 
accurately represented without equal legislative representation, as men will be more likely to 
focus on other issues. Elected female leaders were found to invest more in public goods linked to 
women’s concerns such as public water facilities and infrastructure.  Women were also found to 
have increased levels of political participation and involvement by addressing an issue or 
complaint to an elected leader, though it had negative effects for men. This corresponds to the 
theory that representation quotas should have positive effects on women’s participation and 
involvement.  
 
Leslie Schwindt‐Bayer (2011) and Kotsdam and Nerman (2012) hoped to measure the 
impacts of gender based quotas within legislature on political participation. Schwindt‐Bayer 
measured the impacts of enacting gender representation quotas using 9 measures of political 
participation; political interest, political knowledge, voting, persuading others to vote, working 
for a political campaign, protesting, petitioning government officials for assistance, attending a 
local government meeting, attending political party meetings, and attending women’s group 
meetings. The study analyzed the cross-national effects of quotas at the respondent level on the 
political participation gender gaps. Kotsadam and Nerman (2012) tests the impact of gender 
representation quotas on political interest in Latin America using a similar approach as 
Schwindt‐Bayer, but expands the study in order to measure long-term effects of quota enactment 
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and focuses on whether the respondent would vote in an upcoming election as opposed to how 
interested they are in politics. 
 
Schwindt‐Bayer and Kotsadam and Nerman’s results do not match the type of findings 
obtained from previous research at the local village level by Duflo. Both authors theorized that 
the quota enactment would have positive effects on women’s participation levels and interest in 
politics across Latin America after adjusting for yearly and country level effects. Instead 
Kotsadam and Nerman found that women’s interest in politics decreased after the quota and 
Schwindt‐Bayer found that the quotas did not produce statistically significant effects on the 
















This paper hopes to build and add to the work done previously in the study of gender 
representation quotas. Adapting the model used by Schwindt‐Bayer, the aim is to estimate the 
effects of the introduction of a quota on various political participation measures. In this case 
these will be: 
 
1) Interest in politics (Categorical variable on a scale of 1 to 4 & Binary variable on a scale of 0 
to 1, ranging from no and little interest (0 & 1) to fairly and very interested (1 & 4) 
2) Confidence in Government & Congress (Categorical variable on a scale of 1-4, ranging 
from no confidence to a lot of confidence) 
3) Attention paid to political news (Categorical variable for the number of days a respondent 
pays attention to political news seen on TV; with a scale of 1-5) 
Table 1 Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variables Category Range Frequency Omitted 
Interest In Politics  Binary 0 to 1 
No & Little interest to 
Fairly & Very Interested 
(-2 and -1 
collapsed into No 
(0)) 
Interest In Politics Categorical 1 to 4 
No interest to Very 
Interested 
(-2 and -1, NA and 
Don’t Know) 
Confidence in 
Government Categorical 1 to 4 
No confidence to A lot of 
Confidence 
(-2 and -1, NA and 
Don’t Know) 
Confidence in 
Congress Categorical 1 to 4 
No confidence to A lot of 
Confidence 
(-2 and -1, NA and 
Don’t Know) 
Attention paid to 
political news on TV Categorical 1 to 5 1 day to 5 days  





In order to estimate the impact of the effect on interest in politics, the logistic & the 
ordered logistic probability models were used with the goal of estimating the probability and 
odds ratios of the effect of the quota on interest in politics throughout the years. The enacting of 
a gender representation quota could have some significant effect on the shift in political interest 
at the respondent level and the goal is to measure the effects of the shift, from no and little 
interest to a fair amount and very interested in politics. Likewise, measuring the slight shifts in 
political interest may lend to more intuitive and statistically significant results than previously 
found. 
 
The ordered logistic probability model will be used to measure the impact of the gender-
based quotas on the shifts in respondents’ confidence in government and congress between no, 
little, some and a lot.  
 
The third measure observed, studies the amount of attention paid to political news when 
seen on TV.  The Ordered Logistic probability regression is again used to attain an estimate of 









Methodology and Data 
Model Specification 
This paper attempts to measure quota effects on various outcome measures of a 
respondent’s political interest and knowledge of politics using a difference in difference (DiD) 
approach. For each of the various dependent variables studied, the model is:  
 
ctitcctictcctictcccti vDDFTQbFbTQbQbay  )()()()( 4321  
 
Where:  
(Qc )= Whether the quota was ever enacted in a country (0,1) 
Qc ×Tct= Whether the quota was active in a country in a given year (0 if not enacted in year 
T, 1 if active in year T) 
b3(Fcti )= (Sex) Gender. (0 if male, 1 if female) 
b4(Qc ×Tct ×Fcti )= Interaction between Gender and Quota*Time. (0 if Male and quota not 
active in year T, 1 if female and Quota enacted in year T) 
Dc +Dt= Dummy variables for each year and country 
 
At the respondent level, the variables used include; gender, subjectively measured 
respondent income, age range, marital status, economic perceptions, and education level. We 
also include dummy variables for year and country in order to adjust for yearly and country 
specific effects, the same process was done using the logistic fixed effects regression with 
similar results. It should be noted that the models were run with and without using the variables 
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for income, age range, marital status, economic perceptions and education level. Table 9 shows 
the results without including these variables while Table 11 in the appendix includes them. The 
results do not differ significantly when excluding the variables. 
  
At the country level, the variables used include; the percentage of women in legislature or 
parliamentary office both bicameral and unicameral, logged GDP, whether the quota has ever 
been enacted in a country, whether the quota was enacted within a given country per year, and an 
interaction term for quota and gender.  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Dependent/Independent variables 
Dependent/Outcome Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Attention Paid to Political News on TV 119,971 2.30 1.52 
Interest In Politics 238,856 0.28 0.45 
Confidence in Congress 226,035 2.13 1.09 
Confidence in Government 318,018 1.88 1.12 
Interest in Politics  238,856 1.94 1.06 
    Independent/Explanatory Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Treat,  318,018 0.72 0.45 
Quota,  318,018 0.57 0.50 
Sex 318,018 0.51 0.50 
Interaction term between quota & Sex  
 318,018 0.29 0.45 
Logged GDP (lnGDP) 306,054 8.23 0.72 
Percent of Women in legislature 
(Percentw ) 278,978 0.17 0.09 
 
The explanatory variables are specific at either the respondent level (i) or at the country 
level (c) where b3xcti  to bnxcti represent the estimated effects of the explanatory variables. The 




) will be 1 after a country enacts a quota. Thus if 
(Qc )
Qc ×Tct
(Qc ×Tct ×Fcti )
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the quota was in place in Mexico in 2002, the value will be a 1 and conversely if in the same 
country the quota was not enacted in 1997, it will have a value of 0. The estimator ( 2b ) 
gives the quota effects on the outcome variable ( y
ct






) is the 
interaction between the quota variable and the respondent gender. Thus, the estimator 4b  
allows for gender specific effects to be determined. 
 
A standard concern in studies such as this is whether existing unobserved heterogeneity 
could bias estimates. For example if some third variable is driving up both levels of political 
interest and knowledge and the likelihood of adopting a quota then our estimate ( 2b ) might be 
biased. We introduce dummy variables for both country and year to the model in order to address 
the possibility of both country specific and time (year specific) effects, which lead to upward or 
downward spikes in the various measures of political interest.  If the variable for quota, 
(which includes year enacted) is included on its own, as mentioned previously, issues of 
heterogeneity arise, thus including the treatment variable for whether a country enacted a quota, 
, to adjust for country specific effects should attenuate the bias – we are using the panel 
nature of the data to control for time-invariant effects, in effect compare the same countries 
before and after the quota. Table 3 below shows that after addressing potential bias, quota effects 
become negative and statistically significant. Equation (1) measures the effect of the quota given 
year enacted on interest in politics when taking the binary version of this dependent variable 
while model (3) measures this effect on the categorical version of this variable. (See table: 
Dependent variables) Equations (2) and (4) display the results described above; when 





being 1 if the country ever enacted a quota. The coefficient on “treat”, is positive and 
statistically significant suggesting that countries that enacted quotas showcase higher interest in 
politics. Meanwhile, the coefficient for  , which measures the effect of the quota 
introduction on interest in politics over time, is negative, suggesting that the introduction of the 
quota had negative effects on interest in politics. 
 
 
ycti = a+b1(Qc )+b2(Qc ×Tct )+vcti  
Table 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) 













 0.00 -0.11*** 0.00 -0.21*** 
  (0.90) (0.00)  (0.96) (0.00) 
  0.19***  0.35*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
Cut 1   -0.50 -0.36 
Cut 2   0.89 1.04 
Cut 3   2.37 2.51 
constant 1.99 1.92   
Observations 234,995 234,995 234,995 234,995 















The data used for this study was gathered from the Latino Barometer yearly survey 
datasets. The LatinoBarometer is a cross-national survey that takes place in 18 Latin American 
countries including: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, Venezuela and Spain. Due to differences in colonial history, culture 
and historical economic status, the observations for Spain were omitted. The data covers 1995-
2013 except for the years 1999 & 2012 for which data was not made publicly available. The 
survey question pertaining to interest in politics was also omitted/not asked in the years 2002, 
2006, 2008 and 2011. 
 
Data for the percentage of woman in legislature was retrieved from the World Bank 
through originally published by International Parliamentary Union’s (IPU.org) database on the 
percentage of women in legislature. GDP per capita data was retrieved from the World Bank. 
Schwindt‐Bayer (2011) and the International IDEA (OAS 2010) provide the information on the 
years in which quotas were enacted within Latin American Countries throughout the mid 1990’s 
and early 2000’s. Table 4 provides a list of Latin American countries and the years in which they 
implemented quotas 
 
 The earliest year for which the Latin Barometer survey was conducted is 1995, which 
represents only a year’s worth of data for the pre-quota portion of the study for two of the 








Chile   
Colombia1   
Costa Rica 19972 
Dom. Rep. 1997 
Ecuador 1997 
El Salvador   
Guatemala   
Honduras 2000 
Mexico 1996 







Table 4 Source: Schwindt‐Bayer (2011), OAS (2010) 
 
To create the final dataset, 17 yearly LatinoBarometer datasets were aggregated. 
Although many of the variables and their coding remained the same year to year, the variable 
names did not and had to be manually updated in order to successfully append the data. The 
coding was then updated to reflect dummy variables where necessary as in the case of the gender 
variable where a limited number of observations (<.1%) were coded as “refused to answer or 
don’t know”, and were collapsed into the “male” category within gender. Other variables with 
answers “don’t know, not applicable, refused, etc.” which generally accounted for a small 
                                                        
1 Although Colombia did enact a quota in the year 2000, it was not within the legislative chamber and thus not 
attributed to the country. 
2 Schwidt-Bayer lists the year for Costa Rica as 1996 while OAS lists it as December 6th 1997. 
3 Quota enacted in 1997 and repealed in 2000, being effective for only 2 years. 
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percentage of observations were collapsed into the first “none” or “0” category or in the case of 
the dependent variables, not used in the regression analysis. The only observations dropped were 
those pertinent to Spain, as it was not studied in this analysis. Thus, this study hopes to adopt a 
similar model as Schwindt‐Bayer by using variables for quotas, an interaction term between 
quota and gender, percentage of women in legislature, and economic perceptions along with 
respondent level variables to analyze the long term effects of the quotas enacted in Latin 
American countries. 
 
Table 5 represents the percentage of total interest in the two categories within “Interest in 
politics” throughout the 17-year time period. The first five countries: Chile, El Salvador, 
Colombia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua did not enact gender representation quotas at any point 
within the studied period. The levels of political interest are fairly consistent country-to-country 
ranging from 56-76% at the “not interested level”. Mexico, Uruguay; both countries who enacted 
quotas at some point had the lowest percentage at the “not interested level” with 62 & 56% 
respectively. Though as evidenced in Table 4, interest in politics within respondents from 



















Chile 74.70% 24.47% 0.83% 
Colombia 72.82% 26.25% 0.93% 
El Salvador 69.27% 27.43% 3.31% 
Guatemala 70.95% 24.04% 5.01% 
Nicaragua 73.24% 24.84% 1.93% 
Average Non-Quota 
Countries 72.20% 25.40% 2.40% 
Argentina 68.25% 31.02% 0.73% 
Bolivia 74.00% 24.69% 1.32% 
Brazil 74.32% 25.05% 0.63% 
Costa Rica 73.03% 24.28% 2.69% 
Dom. Rep. 63.88% 35.05% 1.07% 
Ecuador 76.09% 22.65% 1.26% 
Honduras 74.83% 23.21% 1.96% 
Mexico 62.27% 36.82% 0.91% 
Panama 66.45% 31.16% 2.39% 
Paraguay 68.99% 30.22% 0.79% 
Peru 70.41% 27.95% 1.63% 
Uruguay 56.32% 42.58% 1.10% 
Venezuela 67.91% 30.50% 1.59% 
Average Quota Countries 68.98% 29.63% 1.39% 
Average All Countries 69.87% 28.45% 1.67% 
 
Table 6 below details the percentage of political interest at each level both before and 
after the quota was enacted. The table shows the average percentage change in interest in politics 
for the two categories. We used data from the years 1995 and 1996 for the ‘earliest year before 
quota’ percentages. We used data from the years 1998 and 2000 for the ‘3and 4 years after the 
quota’ percentages. For countries in which the survey’s earliest data was for the year 1996, we 
used data from the fourth year after the quota since the survey was not conducted in 1999.  For 
the Fairly and very interested category, there was a positive average effect of 5.07% while there 
was a negative effect for the “none  + little interest” category. This result shows that interest in 
 19 
politics increased after the quotas were enacted while disinterest decreased. However, this may 
be due in part to year specific effects, which we address in the analysis by including year 
dummys. Table 7 showcases the same percentage changes in interest in politics for the non-quota 
countries. The non- quota countries had average effects that were positive and in line with those 
achieved by the quota countries. 
 
 
Table 6 Interest in Politics by Country (Before and after) 
 














Costa Rica 76.72% 17.98% 76.25% 22.32% -0.47% 4.34% 
Ecuador 73.75% 24.75% 73.33% 25.75% -0.42% 1.00% 
Argentina 60.08% 37.67% 60.08% 37.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
Honduras 79.46% 14.93% 80.14% 18.56% 0.68% 3.63% 
Mexico 66.36% 31.64% 66.83% 32.17% 0.47% 0.52% 
Panama 77.91% 17.31% 59.01% 39.58% -18.90% 22.26% 
Paraguay 68.82% 28.45% 67.17% 31.83% -1.66% 3.38% 
Peru 65.66% 32.14% 61.24% 36.56% -4.42% 4.42% 
Bolivia 78.63% 21.11% 70.56% 28.52% -8.07% 7.40% 
Brazil 80.42% 19.50% 70.70% 29.00% -9.72% 9.50% 
Uruguay 54.33% 45.00% 62.42% 36.67% 8.08% -8.33% 
Venezuela 79.08% 19.50% 65.83% 32.17% -13.25% 12.67% 




Table 7 Interest in Politics 1996 vs. 2000 (Before & after non-quota countries) 
 
Earliest year before quota 3 & 4 years after quota Change in Interest  






Very None + Little 
 Fairly 
+ very 
Chile 80.33% 18.92% 63.57% 35.84% -16.76% 16.92% 
Colombia 74.21% 24.29% 74.17% 24.83% -0.04% 0.54% 
El Salvador 64.71% 23.93% 60.14% 38.46% -4.57% 14.53% 
Guatemala 54.85% 21.38% 72.50% 25.08% 17.65% 3.70% 
Nicaragua 63.83% 32.01% 66.80% 30.50% 2.97% -1.51% 
Uruguay 63.58% 36.08% 51.08% 48.00% -12.50% 11.92% 




Table 8 below showcases interest in politics by country for women only. 
Table 8 
 
Interest in Politics by Country (Before and after women only) 
 
Earliest year before quota 3 & 4 years after quota Change in Interest  
 
None + Little Fairly + Very None + Little Fairly + Very 
Percentage 
Change (none + 
Little) & ( fairly + 
very) 
Argentina 66.29% 31.47% 71.34% 27.39% 5.04% -4.08% 
Ecuador 74.33% 23.83% 75.33% 24.33% 1.00% 0.50% 
Mexico 69.76% 27.36% 69.81% 29.17% 0.05% 1.81% 
Paraguay 70.59% 25.88% 70.51% 27.88% -0.08% 2.00% 
Costa Rica 77.45% 15.88% 79.55% 19.02% 2.10% 3.14% 
Honduras 81.02% 13.67% 80.28% 17.95% -0.74% 4.28% 
Bolivia 82.20% 17.33% 75.59% 23.32% -6.61% 5.98% 
Peru 71.47% 26.09% 64.12% 33.02% -7.35% 6.92% 
Uruguay 65.70% 31.54% 58.41% 40.50% -7.29% 8.96% 
Brazil 84.24% 15.60% 74.35% 25.09% -9.89% 9.49% 
Venezuela 83.77% 14.90% 65.42% 31.86% 
-
18.36% 16.96% 
Panama 80.63% 15.61% 61.18% 37.80% 
-
19.45% 22.19% 


















The following section and tables will describe odds ratios for the logistic and ordered 
logistic probability models. An odds ratio coefficient value of less than 1 represents a negative 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent while a coefficient value of greater than 1 
represents a positive effect of the independent variable on the dependent. The independent 
variables associated with the coefficients have been further explained in the “Methodology and 
Data” section. 
In the case of respondent interest in politics, Model 2 in table 9, the odds of a respondent 
being interested in politics, estimate ( 2b ) for variable , are .87 times the odds of a 
respondent not being interested in politics. This aligns with quotas having a negative effect on 
the probability of a respondent having high levels of political interest. However, the coefficient   
( 4b ) for the interaction between quota and female  had differing results. A female 
respondent exposed to the quota is 1.038 times more likely to have higher levels of political 
interest (at 10% significance).  The variable “treat”, , for whether a quota had ever been 
enacted in a country gave an odds ratio of 1.48, which provides positive statistically significant 
results, showcasing higher levels of political interest in countries that enacted a quota. The 
inclusion of the “treat” variable addresses the potential misattribution of the quota*time variable, 
 due to certain countries that enacted the quota having higher initial levels of political 
interest, which may cause upward bias in the coefficient ( 4b ) for . Being that the quota,
 had an odds ratio of .87 which translates to negative effects it can be concluded that 
countries that enacted the quota were already more likely to be interested in politics. The 
(Qc ×Tct )






inclusion of the “treat” variable addresses misattribution bias and allows the capture of quota 
effects. 
 
As expected, the percentage of women in politics, (percentw) in table 9, had an odds ratio 
of 1.938, respondents are almost twice as likely to be interested in politics given higher 
percentages of women in legislature, this translates to positive and statistically significant effects 
on the likelihood that a female respondent would have higher levels of interest in politics. This is 
a noteworthy result since the percentage of women in politics is a direct result of the quotas 
being enacted, and thus its positive and statistically significant effects on interest in politics show 
positive externality effects of the quota. The first model in Table 9 using logistic probability 
gives similar results to model 2 which uses ordered logistic probability, however, the effects of 
the interaction term between quota and gender, , were not statistically significant.  
 
In the case of attention paid to political news on TV, due to the question being asked only 
in the years 1996-1997, 2000-2001 and 2003-2004, fewer observations were used in the analysis. 
Unlike with interest in politics, the quota,  had an odds ratio of 1.353, which 
corresponds to statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood that a respondent pay 
attention to political news more days of the week. The effect on the interaction term between 
quota and gender,  was not statistically significant signaling no quota effect 
difference between men and women.  
 
In the case of confidence in congress the quota, , had an odds ratio estimate of 
0.751, which corresponds to statistically significant negative effects on the likelihood that a 
(Qc ×Tct ×Fcti )
(Qc ×Tct )
(Qc ×Tct ×Fcti )
(Qc ×Tct )
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respondent had higher levels of confidence in congress. The effect on the interaction term 
between quota and gender was not statistically significant signaling no quota effect difference 
between men and women. The effect of the quota,
,
 on the likelihood that a respondent 
had higher levels of confidence in government on other hand was statistically significant and 
positive with an odds ratio estimate of 1.587. A respondent is 1.587 times as likely to have 
higher levels of confidence in government. The interaction term between gender and quota was 
again not statistically significant. 
 
Table 9 below does not include control variables such as age range, education, economic 
perceptions and marital status. The results do not lose significance when omitting these variables 
and the coefficients also stay within a similar range. Table 11 in the appendix includes the model 
with the added control (independent) variables. Table 9 also does not include weights based on 
country population. All countries in the study are given equal weight. Table 10 includes the 
analysis with the inclusion of weights.  
 
We provide the analysis including weights to account for the fact that a country such as 
Brazil has much larger population than El Salvador (200 vs. 6 million), as such the sample of 
around 1000 yearly survey observations per country would give equal weighting to both 
countries in the current analysis (Table 9). Table 10 addresses this by including weights, in order 







ycti = a+b1(Qc )+b2(Qc ×Tct )+b3(Fcti )+b4(Qc ×Tct ×Fcti )+Dc +Dt +vcti  
  Logit Ologit 















  IIP2  IIP  attnpoltv  CC CG  
 1.459*** 1.480*** 0.773*** 1.841*** 1.945*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 0.866*** 0.876*** 1.353*** 0.751*** 1.587*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 0.719*** 0.694*** 1.303*** 0.968** 0.908*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
lnGDP 1.137*** 1.097*** 1.377*** 1.256*** 1.285*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
percentw 2.530*** 1.938*** 1.681* 6.415*** 7.983*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
 1.026  1.038* 0.966 1.004 1.002 
 
(0.205)  (0.03) (0.2) (0.77) (0.5) 
Constant 0.104***         
cut1   0.52 1.1 2.01 1.86 
cut2   1.94 2.2 3.6 3.32 
cut3   3.45 3.23 5.48 4.95 
cut4     4.82   3.24 
Observations  201,016   198,137   71,871   267,543   187,852  
  
p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01; 
*,**,*** 
   
Table 10 below includes a weight variable (pop) that takes the 2014 population within 
each of the countries studied. Here the interaction term is statistically significant 
and in line with results found when not including the weights. As the results from including and 
excluding weights do not differ significantly for interest in politics and attention paid to political 
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  Logit Ologit 
















  IIP2  IIP  attnpoltv  CC CG  
(Qc ) 2.946*** 2.546*** 0.440*** 2.278*** 0.601*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(Qc ×Tct )  0.790*** 0.863*** 2.289*** 1.01 1.078* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.08) 
(Fcti )  0.691*** 0.675*** 1.321*** 0.98 0.923*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) 
(Qc ×Tct ×Fcti )  1.104*** 1.121*** 0.935* 0.989 0.992 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.56) (0.73) 
lnGDP 0.755*** 0.792*** 1.888*** 1.044 2.438*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) 
percentw 2.947*** 2.389*** 2.304** 3.225*** 3.156*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 2.448*         
cut1   0.142*** 27.021*** 1.595 746.500*** 
cut2   0.556 82.059*** 7.555*** 3076.848*** 
cut3   2.426** 223.081*** 50.517*** 15557.678*** 
cut4     1022.730***     
 
    
  
  
Observations  201,016   198,137   71,871   267,543   187,852  
  
p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01; 
*,**,*** 









The results of the models used to study the effects of female representation quotas on 
interest in politics fall in line with those found in the works of Schwindt‐Bayer (2011) and 
Kotsadam and Nerman (2012). These being that the quota itself had negative effects on the 
respondent interest in politics, however, unlike previous results from Schwidndt-Bayer, the 
interaction term, which modeled the effect of female respondents exposed to the quota, was 
positive and statistically significant for political interest when looking at the longer term impacts.  
 
The negative quota effects on interest in politics are surprising as the opposite effects are 
to be expected from the gender representation policies, and are in stark contrast to the overall 
increase in women’s representation since 1997 from 10% to 22%. The root cause of the negative 
quota effects may be linked to a larger dislike for affirmative action policies in Latin American 
countries. However the positive effects of the quota on confidence in government suggests that’s 
Latin American respondents react favorably to government actions and efforts to abide by 
mandates from respected international movements led by organizations such as the UN and the 
EU. As such, respondents who see them as a measure of affirmative action may regard quotas 
negatively. The positive effect of the interaction term between the quota and gender shows that 
although quota effects are negative overall, the negative effect on women is less so than on men. 
This can interpreted as women seeing enhanced opportunities and access to the political sphere, 
resulting in quota effects that are close to neutral. 
 
This study expands on Schwindt‐Bayer’s cross-sectional study by analyzing long-term 
quotas effects in a quasi-panel structure as was done by Kotsadam and Nerman (2012). We use 
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differing methods from Schwindt‐Bayer and Kotsadam and Nerman in estimating the gender 
representation quota effects by utilizing the ordered logistics regression which should provide a 
more accurate representation of the changes within each of the categories of the dependent 
variables, we also focus on the variables of interest and adjust for country and time invariant 
effects. Our focus on the long-term effects is an enhancement to the work done by researchers 
previously proves a worthwhile extension, as we are able to demonstrate statistically significant 
positive impacts of the quota among women, which when taken along with the general quota 
effects result in less severe negative impacts for women. This points to a differential impact on 
men and women of the gender representation quotas, women are less adversely affected by quota 
introduction than men.  
 
We also show that quotas had positive effects on both attention paid to political news on 
TV and respondent confidence in government with no statistically significant difference between 
the effects on men and women. As expected the percentage of women in legislature had positive 
effects on all variables studied which is in line with Clots-Figueras’ (2012) “role model” effect. 
Another interesting finding is that men are more likely to be interest in politics, have confidence 
in congress and government but women are more likely to pay attention to political news on TV. 
This could provide a new avenue and way to reach potential female participants in Latin 
America. 
 
It is not to be doubted that political participation rates for women have increased in the 
last two decades since the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, which spurred the 
enactment of gender representation quotas. We now see women taking leadership roles at the 
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highest levels within politics such as current Latin American presidents Michelle Bachelet of 
Chile, Dilma Rousseff of Brazil and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina. The role of 
women in legislative positions is ever important in even countries such as the United States, 
where women’s reproductive rights have roused many a debate and in recent years.   
 
The results of this study further the understanding of gender representation quotas as we 
now observe a significant impact of these quotas on women’s political interest. Thanks to the 
representation quotas, women’s participation rates have increased significantly to 22% as of 
2016 (QuotaProject) and likely had some effect on the rise in female world leaders and 
legislators. It cannot be doubted that representation has an impact on women in the form of 
aspirations and role model effects, which we see in everyday situations, such as the push in prior 
decades to have the famous Barbie doll include professions that were not centered around 
homecare or the recent push to include increase female interest in STEM fields with programs 
such as the “Girls who code”. However, the empirical evidence has not previously been evident 
when it comes to female representations quotas. In recent year’s studies by researchers have 
utilized survey data to approximate changes in political interest, however looking at actual voter 
turnout and registration rates may be more representative of the changing landscape within 
politics and accurately showcase whether women have gained access to and are encouraged to 
participate in politics. If women and to a larger extent other historically disadvantaged groups 
feel their voices will be heard, they’ll be more likely to seek out and participate in politics. 
 
 It would be apt to model the gender quota effects on educational attainment within Latin 
America and conducting the time series study at the local level in specific Latin American 
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countries to more accurately measure the true effects. As previously mentioned, if voter 
registration and turnout data were available for Latin American countries it would open the door 






























  Logit Ologit 
Table 11 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 










treat 1.638*** 1.668*** 0.805** 2.281*** 2.721*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
quota 0.839*** 0.863*** 1.323*** 0.723*** 1.300*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
sex 0.733*** 0.720*** 1.287*** 1.014 0.946*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -0.23 (0.00) 
quotaxsex 1.026 1.035* 0.961 1.002 1.011 
 (0.21) (0.04) (0.14) (0.87) (0.52) 
longed 0.984 0.952 1.379*** 0.999 0.856*** 
 (0.63) (0.07) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) 
percentw 2.142*** 1.574*** 2.052** 5.628*** 5.917*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Range (25-45) 1.050*** 1.004 0.875*** 0.932*** 1.087*** 
(0.00) -0.74 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Range (45-65) 1.029 0.937*** 0.816*** 0.947*** 1.182*** 
(0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Range (65- 100) 0.858*** 0.754*** 0.876*** 1.021 1.308*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
Marital Status: Single 1.124*** 1.079*** 0.978 1.012 0.986 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Marital Status: 
Separated 
1.026 0.997 0.969 1.005 1 
(0.15) (0.84) (0.17) (0.69) (0.99) 
Subjective Income 1.217*** 1.201*** 0.871*** 1.104*** 1.114*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Economic 
Perceptions: Average 
1.128*** 1.222*** 0.958** 1.799*** 2.376*** 




1.946*** 1.967*** 0.709*** 3.145*** 5.089*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.162***         
cut1   0.01 0.68 0.87 -5.68 
cut2   1.46 1.79 2.52 -4.60 
cut3   2.98 2.83 4.45 -0.42 
cut4     4.43   1.14 
cut5         2.86 
Observations  201,016   198,137   71,871   267,543   187,852  
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